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INTRODUCTION
A professional offered a software engineering job at a big Silicon
Valley company seems to be in a good position to negotiate her
employment contract. She is educated, has experience, and may even
negotiate her salary and fringe benefits, but she is unlikely to demand
her prospective employer remove the mandatory arbitration provision
in her employment agreement. Why? Because she needs the job.
Now imagine this professional is a Senegalese national who has
waited months to be sponsored on an H-1B visa by the same Silicon
Valley company. All of her immigration paperwork has gone through
and she has arranged to come to the United States. However, when
she receives her employment contract, it contains a mandatory
179
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arbitration provision. She thinks she understands what the provision
means, but she does not argue against it because she is afraid that if
she does, she may lose her job, causing her H-1B visa to be
terminated.
Fast forward a year later: that same Senegalese software engineer
is having problems with her employer.
The company is
discriminating against her and many other female software engineers.
She consults an attorney who tells her the case would be best pursued
as a class action, otherwise the claim is too small to be worthwhile.
The problem is that the mandatory arbitration provision she “agreed”
to bars her from bringing any action before a court. Because her
individual claim is not worth the trouble, she never asserts her rights
and continues to bear the worsening discrimination at work.
The fairness and ethics of mandatory arbitration have been
sharply debated. 1 A recent Supreme Court decision upholding the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts
appears to have settled this debate. 2 However, workers still face
challenges in asserting their rights when their employers impose
arbitration. 3 Some scholars suggest mandatory arbitration is less
likely to harm employees with high levels of education, income, and
experience. 4 Despite their education, income, and experience, skilled

1. Laetitia L. Cheltenham, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
Class Action Waivers After AT&T v. Concepcion, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 273, 277
(2012); see also United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006); EDWARD BRUNET ET AL.,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006).
2. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018).
3. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration,
94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 10 (2019).
4. See Allison E. McClure, The Professional Presumption: Do Professional
Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter into
Employment-Related Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1515 (2006)
(providing rationales for findings of equal bargaining power between professional
employees and employers); cf. E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees
and Small Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 628 (2009) (arguing that
“high-level” employees do not face the same problems with mandatory arbitration as
other “low-level” employees because of bargaining power, sophistication, and
“informational advantages in negotiating”).
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immigrants 5 in the technology sector (“tech”) are actually in a worse
position than their native-born counterparts to negotiate employment
terms. 6 This is because visa sponsorship requires a single employer to
sponsor a skilled immigrant to work in the United States, meaning the
immigrant employee cannot easily transfer their visa to a different
employer. 7 Changing employers or being fired puts a skilled
immigrant worker at significant risk for deportation. 8 Being restricted
to a single employer creates a compelling incentive for skilled
immigrant workers to accept unfavorable arbitration terms. 9 In
response to this problem and the fact that mandatory arbitration is a
polarizing issue, this article presents a balanced solution that weighs
the protection of skilled immigrant rights against the benefits of
arbitration.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of skilled
immigrant workers in the United States, explains arbitration
procedure, and introduces the arguments for and against mandatory
arbitration. Part II analyzes the current judicial and legislative
positions on arbitration, describes skilled immigrants in the tech
industry, and explores ways tech workers have pushed back against
mandatory arbitration. Part III proposes a hybrid solution to the issue
of mandatory arbitration. Finally, this Comment offers a brief
conclusion on the unique challenges skilled immigrants face regarding
mandatory arbitration.
5. While recognizing the multitude of problems that mandatory arbitration
creates for low-wage earning immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, this
paper does not address these groups and is narrowly focused on skilled immigrants
in the tech industry.
6. Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth
Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 928
(2007) [hereinafter Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor].
7. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D) (2019) (requiring a skilled immigrant on an H1B visa wishing to change employers to have the prospective employer submit a
completely new visa application that must be approved before the change of
employment can take place); see also Symposium, Working Borders: Linking
Debates About Insourcing and Outsourcing of Capital and Labor, 40 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 691, 802 (2005) [hereinafter Working Borders] (advocating for additional legal
rights for immigrants, like the ability to port work visas to another employer).
8. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926.
9. See Working Borders, supra note 7, at 802 (explaining how the prospect of
portable employment visas would give skilled immigrants more bargaining power).
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I. POSITIONS ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Mandatory arbitration agreements are common in employment
contracts. 10 Professor Michael Z. Green 11 describes the increase in
these agreements and states, “[A]greements to arbitrate have expanded
to virtually every possible contractual setting, including the
employment relationship.” 12 In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
a 5-4 decision in Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 13 which essentially leaves
employees at the mercy of employer-dictated arbitration clauses. 14
The dissent in Epic Systems outlined several problems with mandatory
arbitration of employment disputes, but primarily focused on the
ways mandatory arbitration eviscerates employee rights to collective
actions. 15 Because skilled immigrants are restricted to a single,
sponsoring employer when they work in the United States on an
employment visa, they are particularly vulnerable to unfair
employment conditions, 16 including injustices caused by mandatory

10. Peter Danysh, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting
AT&T v. Concepcion to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1433,
1439 (2013).
11. Professor Michael Z. Green is a law professor at Texas A&M University
Law School. He has been a full tenure professor since 2005. Before his academic
career he worked as manager for a Fortune 500 company before law school and later
represented employers as a chief negotiator.
12. Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining
Power in Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions,
10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 77, 80 (2003).
13. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
14. See Ronald Turner, The FAA, The NLRA, and Epic Systems’ Epic Fail, 98
TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18 (2019).
15. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1633-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion);
see also Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards
Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155,
179 (2019) [hereinafter Sternlight, Stymies Progress] (explaining how mandatory
arbitration prevents employees from bringing class action lawsuits).
16. See Matthew Lister, Justice and Temporary Labor Migration, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 116 (2014) (explaining how skilled immigrants are vulnerable
because they are unable to easily change employers on the same visa, which makes
immigrant workers “more susceptible to abuse”); see also Miles B. Farmer,
Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J.
2346, 2355 (2012) (“Mandatory arbitration presents large potential for abuse,
particularly in cases where the parties have unequal bargaining power.”).
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arbitration. Working in the United States on an employment visa
leaves skilled immigrants with very few options or bargaining power
to negotiate employment terms. 17
A. Immigrant Workers and the Challenges of H-1B Sponsorship
Immigrant workers are essential to the United States. 18 According
to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 28.4 million “foreign
born” individuals were part of the U.S. work force in 2019. 19 In 2007
twenty-five percent of immigrants in the United States were present
through employment-based immigration visas. 20 The H-1B visa an
employment visa that allows highly-skilled immigrants to work in the
United States. 21 H-1B visas require a single employer to sponsor an
immigrant worker. 22 Highly-skilled immigrants employed in the tech
industry are often present in the United States on these visas. 23
17. See Janna Giesbrecht-McKee, The Fairness Problem: Mandatory
Arbitration in Employment Contracts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 268-69 (2014)
(explaining that employees are compelled to agree when they have limited
employment options and their employment is conditioned on consent to mandatory
arbitration provisions).
18. See Yasser Killawi, Preserving an Entrepreneurial America: How
Restrictive Immigration Policies Stifle the Creation and Growth of Startups and
Small Businesses, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 129, 142 (2013).
19. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor
Force
Characteristics–2019
(May
16,
2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf. (describing foreign-born workers
as legally-admitted immigrants, refugees, temporary residents such as students and
temporary workers, and undocumented immigrants).
20. Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the
Highly-Skilled and Educated in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495,
496 (2007); see also Julie Monroe, Protecting the H-1B Visa: A Promise to “Hire
American” in the “Nation of Immigrants”, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2019)
(“The H-1B visa is the classic route for ‘highly educated, foreign-born students
hoping to work in the U.S.”).
21. Killawi, supra note 18, at 144 (explaining that the H-1B visa is “the
primary source for highly skilled immigrants in the U.S. workforce”).
22. Lister, supra note 16, at 116.
23. See Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New
H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2000) (explaining that the
U.S. high-tech industry largely participates in the H-1B visa program to meet the
demand for skilled workers); see also Dina Gerdeman, Immigrant High-Tech
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The H-1B visa is especially important to Silicon Valley
companies because the visas are used to satisfy the tech industry’s
demand for highly-skilled workers through hiring of skilled
immigrants. 24 The number of available H-1B visas is limited to
65,000 visas each fiscal year and an additional 20,000 visas are
allocated to workers who hold advanced degrees from U.S.
universities. 25 Yet, demand for H-1B visas consistently exceeds the
annual limit with more than 200,000 petitions submitted annually.26
From 2010-2016, Silicon Valley had the second highest number of
approved H-1B visas nationally. 27 The high demand for H-1B visas
compared to their limited availability makes securing an H-1B visa
extremely competitive, especially in the technology industry. 28
Applying for an H-1B visa is a challenging and expensive
process. 29 Since the allocation of total H-1B visas is reached quickly,
applicants have a short window in which they must submit their visa
application. 30 H-1B applications are subject to a lottery system where
applications are randomly selected for adjudication. 31 Although an
employer has no way of knowing whether their application will be

Workers
Not
Costing
US
Jobs,
FORBES
(Jan.
22,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/01/22/immigrant-hightech-workers-not-costing-us-jobs/#1e7adaa74f72.
24. See Danielle M. Drago, Losing the Best and the Brightest: The
Disappearing Wage Premium for H-1B Visa Recipients, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 1051, 1054 (2015) (explaining that the demand for skilled immigrants in the
technology industry “remains largely unmet,” and in order to satisfy this demand,
employers turn to the H-1B visa to hire foreign workers).
25. Robert D. Aronson & Debra A. Schneider, A Bridge over Troubled
Waters: The High-Skilled Worker Rule and Its Impact on Employment-Based
Immigration, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 935, 939 (2018).
26. Id.
27. Neil G. Ruiz & Jens Manuel Krogstad, East Coast and Texas metros had
the most H-1B visas for skilled workers from 2010 to 2016, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/29/h-1b-visaapprovals-by-us-metro-area/.
28. Drago, supra note 24, at 1054.
29. Monroe, supra note 20, at 1388.
30. See id. (in 2016 the H-1B cap was reached in five days).
31. Emily C. Callan, Is the Game Still Worth the Candle (or the Visa)? How
the H-1B Visa Lottery Lawsuit Illustrates the Need for Immigration Reform, 80 ALB.
L. REV. 335, 336 (2017).
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selected for processing, employers often try to increase their chances
of selection. 32 Applications not selected are eligible for resubmission
the following year. 33
The structure of the H-1B visa application process keeps
employees restricted to their employers; only a single employer can
sponsor an immigrant worker. 34 To change employers, the skilled
immigrant employee must have their new H-1B employer submit a
new visa petition on the employee’s behalf. 35 If the petition is denied,
the immigrant employee’s authorization to work in the United States
will be terminated. 36
Skilled immigrants must wait years for their immigration status to
change from an H-1B immigrant to permanent resident due to
immigration backlogs. 37 While waiting to become a permanent
resident, immigrant employees must remain employed with the same
employer. 38 Termination of employment will terminate the immigrant
employee’s H-1B status, 39 which can eliminate the immigrant
worker’s only chance of becoming a permanent resident. Terminated
status can also lead to deportation. 40 The risk of deportation also
applies to a spouse or child covered under a skilled immigrant’s H-1B
visa. 41 Because of this close, interdependent relationship, the

32. See id. at 345 (describing how some large employers use subsidiaries to
submit multiple H-1B applications for the same employees).
33. Id. at 336.
34. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2019).
35. 8 U.S.C § 1184 (2020).
36. 8 U.S.C § 1184(n)(1) (2020).
37. Janice D. Villiers, Closing the Borders: Reverse Brain Drain and the Need
for Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1877, 1889 (2009).
38. Julia Funke, Supply and Demand: Immigration of the Highly Skilled and
Educated in the Post-9/11 Market, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 419, 443 (2015).
39. Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A Critical Look at the H-1B Visa Program
and Its Effects on U.S. and Foreign Workers-A Controversial Program Unhinged
from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 855 (2009).
40. See Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A
Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers, 38 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L.
1, 3 (2017) [hereinafter Ontiveros, H-1B Visas].
41. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926.
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immigrant worker’s reliance on the sponsoring H-1B employer has
been described as a “de facto indentured servitude.” 42
Many tech companies are founded or led by skilled immigrants.43
Immigrant entrepreneurship is important to the U.S. economy and
drives economic growth. 44 California has the most immigrantfounded, startup companies valued at least $1 billion or more
headquartered in the state. 45 Such companies include SpaceX and
Uber. 46 Silicon Valley, California is home to at least 2,000 tech
companies. 47 Like other companies, tech companies often include
mandatory arbitration clauses in their employment agreements. 48
However, the trend of using mandatory arbitration clauses in the
context of employment agreements appears to be changing in Silicon
Valley. 49

42. Fulmer, supra note 39, at 855; see also Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note
40, at 4 (discussing how the H-1B visas program perpetuates a form of involuntary
servitude).
43. See Villiers, supra note 37, at 1877-78.
44. Killawi, supra note 18, at 131.
45. Stuart Anderson, NFAP Policy Brief: Immigrants and Billion Dollar
Startups, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POL’Y (March 2016) http://nfap.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-PolicyBrief.March-2016.pdf.
46. Id. at 1-2.
47. Kimberly Amadeo, Silicon Valley, America’s Innovative Advantage, THE
BALANCE (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-silicon-valley3305808.
48. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in
Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of
Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1235 (2002) (stating that arbitration
agreements are standard in most employment contracts).
49. See Andrew Bratslavsky, Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Assaults in
Maritime Law, 31 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 198, 219 (2019) (explaining that influential
Silicon Valley companies are creating a new trend around mandatory arbitration,
specifically with sexual harassment cases).
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B. An Overview of Arbitration
Arbitration is a type of alternative dispute resolution 50 where the
parties select a neutral arbitrator to assist them in resolving their
dispute. 51 The arbitrator is not required to adhere to relevant law52
unless the law to be applied is specified in the party’s arbitration
agreement. 53 Many arbitration agreements do not address this issue, in
which case, 54 the arbitrator will apply the rules of their arbitration
organization, 55 or “interpret[] the agreement between the parties.”56
The arbitrator’s decision is binding and final, unless it can be shown
that the arbitrator reached the decision by “manifestly disregard[ing]
the law.” 57 In cases where there is a significant problem with the
arbitration process, the parties can seek to have a court determine the
validity of an arbitration award. 58 Agreements that impose arbitration
clauses are typically considered a type of adhesion contract because
the party with less bargaining power is usually unable to negotiate or
reject the arbitration terms. 59 Applied in the context of employment,
an employee is unlikely to reject or negotiate an arbitration provision
because the employer has superior bargaining power and can simply
elect not to hire the employee. 60 Skilled immigrants relying on an
employment visa to work likely find themselves in this position.

50. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal
Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP.
RESOL. 469, 469 (2006).
51. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 454 (1996).
52. Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
347, 350 (1997).
53. Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and
the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 112 (1997).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 118.
56. Matthews, supra note 52, at 351.
57. See Burton, supra note 50, at 473.
58. Id. at 473-74.
59. See id. at 479; Matthews, supra note 52, at 373.
60. Matthews, supra note 52, at 373.
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The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the guiding legislation on
arbitration. The relevant text of the FAA states, “[a]n agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.” 61 With the enactment of the FAA,
Congress made parties’ election to arbitrate enforceable through
contract law. 62 Even after the FAA was enacted, courts initially cited
public policy as a basis not to enforce arbitration clauses. 63
Eventually, however, courts moved towards a uniform policy of
enforcing the FAA, which meant judicial enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. 64
The practice of imposing arbitration was not always a widespread
or favored mechanism for dispute resolution as it is now. 65 Despite a
broad approach to enforcement, courts were careful not to impede
employees’ rights, and often rejected enforcement of mandatory
arbitration clauses in certain employment disputes. 66 Over time,
courts abandoned their position against mandatory arbitration in
employment agreements. 67 With the judiciary’s backing, employers
used the FAA as a basis to enforce arbitration clauses in employment
agreements. 68 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, the
61. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
62. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Turner, supra note 14, at 18.
65. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (explaining that mandatory arbitration is a more recent
phenomenon) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping].
66. See Meredith Goldich, Throwing Out the Threshold: Analyzing the
Severability Conundrum Under Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 60 AM. U.L.
REV. 1673, 1687 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court case Barrentine v. ArkansasBest Freight System, Inc., where the court rejected arbitration of a FLSA
employment claim).
67. See Martha Nimmer, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 196 (2010) (stating lower courts cited the
Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation “to
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts”).
68. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment
Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457-58 (2016) (stating the
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Supreme Court used the FAA to hold that a stock broker’s age
discrimination claim was subject to mandatory arbitration. 69 Not
surprisingly, following Gilmer, in the late 1990’s, the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements increased
significantly. 70 Similar holdings followed in several cases leading up
to the Supreme Court decision in Epic Systems in 2018. 71 With the
judiciary’s shift towards enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, employers gained a strong position to impose arbitration
on employees. 72
C. What’s So Wrong with Mandatory Arbitration?
Requiring employees to sign agreements containing mandatory
arbitration provisions—as a condition of employment—is often
viewed as coercive and problematic for employees. 73 An individual
seeking a job does not have much bargaining power, if any at all,
when it comes to negotiating how a future dispute with an employer
should be resolved. 74 This is especially true for skilled immigrants
who are not only seeking employment, but who are also seeking an
employer’s sponsorship: a lengthy and costly process. 75 Most
employees are presented employment agreements with mandatory
arbitration clauses on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. 76
In other
instances, employees are simply deemed to have knowledge of
FAA was not intended for employment agreements, but the Supreme Court extended
FAA enforcement to employment agreements with its holding in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).
69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
70. See Nimmer, supra note 67, at 187.
71. See generally, Turner, supra note 14.
72. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 262.
73. Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 458; Stephanie Greene &
Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court Endorses Mandatory
Individual Arbitration Agreements-#timesup on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 43, 45 (2019).
74. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 45 (explaining agreements
with mandatory arbitration provisions are offered to employees as a condition of
employment).
75. Sameer Ahmed, Targeting Highly-Skilled Immigrant Workers in A Post9/11 America, 79 UMKC L. REV. 935, 987 (2011).
76. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 45.
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mandatory arbitration clauses when such clauses are emailed to
unsuspecting employees or hidden in fine print. 77
Mandatory arbitration is criticized for other reasons as well. First,
mandatory arbitration can restrict an employee’s access to courts.78
Arbitration also prevents class action litigation, which can be useful
when an employee’s individual claims are weak or monetarily
insubstantial. 79 Third, employers that routinely arbitrate tend to win
more cases than employees. 80 There is also a fairness and impartiality
concern because employers often select and pay the arbitrator. 81
Further, arbitration ensures that claims of sexual harassment and
discrimination are hidden from the public eye. 82 Finally, arbitrators
do not have to be attorneys or even judges. 83

77. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 171-72; see also
Colvin, supra note 3, at 10 (“Although mandatory employment arbitration is usually
established by having employees sign an arbitration agreement, typically at the time
of hiring, in some instances businesses adopt arbitration procedures simply by
announcing that these procedures have been incorporated into the organization’s
employment policies as part of the procedures for resolving workplace conflicts or
grievances.”).
78. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees How American Employers Are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) [hereinafter Sternlight, Disarming Employees].
79. Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 65, at 1652.
80. Cf. Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 462-63 (explaining
that employees win less often against employers that repeatedly arbitrate at high
rates).
81. See Sharon Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131,
134 (1996) (explaining that arbitration decisions can be motivated by a desire on the
part of the arbitrator to secure repeat business from employers and, accordingly,
arbitrators may recognize the benefit of providing favorable decisions to employers
over employees who are unlikely to use arbitration frequently).
82. See Marissa Ditkowsky, Comment, #Ustoo: The Disparate Impact of and
Ineffective Response to Sexual Harassment of Low-Wage Workers, 62 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 76-77 (2019) (discussing how the #Metoo movement has
highlighted the way mandatory arbitration prohibits sexual harassment and
discrimination claims in court).
83. Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401,
1425 (2004) [hereinafter Sternlight, Best Procedure].
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D. Benefits of Arbitration
By contrast, supporters of arbitration argue that the procedure is
actually beneficial for employees. Although mandatory arbitration is
overwhelmingly criticized, employees can benefit from arbitration as
a form of dispute resolution. 84 Litigation takes time, but arbitration is
lauded as being quick and efficient, which can be attractive to
employees. 85 However, because arbitration requires up-front fees, and,
in some cases, the same kinds of costs associated with trial, it is not
completely settled whether arbitration is cost effective (though
proponents of arbitration generally argue that it is). 86 Nonetheless,
arbitration can be less expensive than litigation depending on the
particular case and how it is arbitrated. 87 Although arbitration
requires up-front fees, proponents argue it is more cost effective than
litigation.88 For example, some cases may be arbitrated in a couple of
hours or entirely by phone. 89 Proponents also argue arbitration “is
more likely to preserve a good relationship with an employer” and
“allows employer savings to funnel into more generous employee
compensation and benefits.” 90 For skilled immigrants, preserving
their employment relationship is paramount since their immigration

84. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 266.
85. Amanda R. James, Because Arbitration Can Be Beneficial, It Should Never
Have to Be Mandatory: Making A Case Against Compelled Arbitration Based upon
Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Consumer and Employee Adhesion
Contracts, 62 LOY. L. REV. 531, 537 (2016).
86. Id. at 538. (explaining that there is a question as to the cost efficiency of
arbitration and a lack of empirical data to draw a clear conclusion).
87. See Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 68, at 466 (explaining how
low-income workers can benefit from arbitration because some view arbitration as
cheaper); see also Burton, supra note 50, at 472-73 (describing “arbitration will be
tailored to the dispute” with arbitration duration and discovery level depending on
the stakes of each arbitration); compare James, supra note 85, at 538-39 (suggesting
that arbitration may or may not be less expensive for litigants depending on different
factors), with Rhys E. Burgess, Comment, Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect
Themselves: The Efficacy of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Homes,
17 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 15 (2015) (“Arbitration advocates claim that by curtailing
pre-trial procedures such as discovery, litigation costs are substantially reduced[.]”).
88. James, supra note 85, at 538.
89. Burton, supra note 50, at 472-73.
90. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 266.
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status likely depends on it. 91 One of the issues underlying the benefits
of arbitration is the assumption that employees voluntarily choose to
arbitrate their disputes. 92 However, when an employee does not
voluntarily choose to arbitrate and, instead, is forced to arbitrate, the
perceived advantages of arbitration are called into question. 93 This is
especially true when there are disparate bargaining advantages
between tech companies and skilled immigrants who are relying on
the employer for their H-1B visa sponsorship.
Arbitration procedures are also typically more flexible and
oftentimes the parties can decide the rules governing their
arbitration. 94 Although being an attorney is not a requirement to be an
arbitrator, 95 arbitrators can include experts in a given area. Relying on
experts in a given area may be preferable to parties and helpful in
resolving their dispute. 96
II. NAVIGATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
A. Epic Systems: The Supreme Court’s Recent Support for Mandatory
Arbitration
The Supreme Court’s latest decision on mandatory arbitration in
the employment context has a profound impact on employees. 97 The
Epic Systems decision is comprised of three separate employment
disputes. 98 Each dispute was subject to contract provisions that
imposed arbitration and waived the employees’ ability to bring or
participate in class action litigation.99 In each suit, the plaintiff
employee brought either a court action or a class action in direct
91. See Ahmed, supra note 75, at 945-46 (explaining how immigrants present
on H-1B visas often do not change employers for fear of delay or disruption of their
immigrant status).
92. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 275.
93. Id. at 267.
94. James, supra note 85, at 540; see Cole, supra note 51, at 456 (stating when
parties select arbitration, they can elect their own procedures).
95. Sternlight, Best Procedure, supra note 83, at 1425.
96. Cole, supra note 51, at 457.
97. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 44.
98. Turner, supra note 14, at 31.
99. Id.
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opposition to the mandatory arbitration clauses each had signed. 100
Because the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) forbids waivers
of collective actions in the employment context, the employees raised
an illegality defense under the FAA’s savings clause. 101 The Court
conceded arbitration clauses could be revoked due to a contract
defense, like illegality, but rejected the employees’ argument,
reasoning that arbitration clauses were not illegal merely because the
clause required the parties to arbitrate their disputes. 102 In sum, the
Court held the NLRA does not supersede the FAA, making class
action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements enforceable. 103
One major issue with the Court’s decision is the presumption
employees knowingly and consensually enter into arbitration
agreements. 104 Justice Gorsuch framed the main issue in Epic Systems
as follows: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that
any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their
claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with
their employers?” 105 By assuming employees knowingly enter into
arbitration agreements, the Court overlooks extensive information
underscoring the disparity in bargaining power between employers
and employees. 106 The Court also overlooks the coercive nature of
mandatory arbitration agreements, especially when an arbitration
agreement is tied to a job, 107 or in the case of skilled immigrants, H1B visa sponsorship.
Ultimately, the decision in Epic Systems denies employees the
ability to challenge mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements, which in turn prevents employees from asserting their

100. Id. at 32.
101. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
102. Id. at 1623; see also Turner, supra note 14, at 34-35 (discussing Justice
Gorsuch’s rejection of the illegality defense to mandatory arbitration clauses in Epic
Systems).
103. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624; Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra
note 73, at 46.
104. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70.
105. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
106. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70.
107. Id.
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rights through a class or collective action mechanism. 108 The Epic
Systems decision is generally viewed as “one of the most significant
and most damaging to employees.” 109 With the Epic Systems
decision, employees are left with little recourse against mandatory
arbitration clauses imposed by their employers. 110
Like most employees, skilled immigrants are vulnerable to the
ramifications of Epic Systems, but they are even more vulnerable
because, as professionals, they are viewed as having equal bargaining
power with employers. 111 This mistaken presumption likely causes
legislators and judges to presume skilled immigrants have equal
bargaining power with their employers and overlook the specific
challenges skilled immigrants face regarding mandatory arbitration
provisions in an employment contract. One specific challenge for
skilled immigrants is their visa sponsorship essentially binds them to
their employer. 112 This causes skilled immigrants to have even less
bargaining power than an average employee because if they challenge
the mandatory arbitration agreements in their employment contracts,
skilled immigrants cannot easily seek an alternate employer.
Justice Ginsburg led a powerful dissent in Epic Systems that began
by placing the NLRA and its predecessor statute, the NorrisLaGuardia Act (“NLGA”), within historical context. 113
After
illustrating longstanding power imbalances between employees and
employers, Justice Ginsburg explained that Congress enacted the
NLGA and NLRA with “acute awareness: [f]or workers striving to
gain . . . decent terms and conditions of employment, there is strength
in numbers.” 114 Under the dissent’s analysis, the NLRA was not

108. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 177-78.
109. Id. at 177.
110. Id. at 178.
111. Spitko, supra note 4, at 628.
112. See Killawi, supra note 18 at 144 (explaining H-1B visas require a
sponsoring employer).
113. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting opinion).
114. Id.; see also Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 63 (noting
coercive tactics by employers such as “yellow dog contracts,” which prevented
employees from joining a union, led Congress to pass the NLRA).
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considered subordinate to the FAA because neither the case law cited
by the majority, nor the FAA, required subordination. 115
The Epic Systems dissent also raised a few important
considerations. First, an individual employee’s claim may be too
small and not worth the trouble of pursuing in court. 116 Because
mandatory arbitration subverts an employee’s right to bring a
collective action, the employee, forced to go it alone, may never bring
a claim. 117 Second, employees might not fully understand what they
are waiving when they agree or are deemed to have consented to
mandatory arbitration clauses. 118
Justice Ginsburg noted the
mandatory arbitration clauses at issue in Epic Systems were emailed to
employees. By remaining in their employment, the employees were
deemed to have consented. 119 Mandatory arbitration, as imposed in
the manner described in Epic Systems, raises serious concerns about
whether the parties are truly entering into such agreements
bilaterally. 120 Third, and perhaps most important, is the fact that
mandatory arbitration clauses stand to undermine the enforcement of
statutory rights. 121 Since mandatory arbitration prevents employees
from bringing collective actions that may be more practical than an
115. Harvard Law Review, Case Comment, Federal Arbitration Act and
National Labor Relations Act-Arbitration and Collective Actions-Collective
Arbitration Waivers-Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 427, 431
(2018); see also Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting
opinion) (“Nothing in the FAA or this Court’s case law, however, requires
subordination of the NLRA’s protections.”).
116. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion).
117. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 63.
118. Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172 (“Studies have shown
that these kinds of clauses are not, in fact, generally read or understood by
employees; certainly these are not the knowing agreements alluded to by Justice
Gorsuch [in Epic Systems].”).
119. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion);
see also Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172.
120. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV.
1017, 1038 (1996) (“Some courts might find that some arbitration clauses do not
give employees adequate notice of the fact that by signing them, they are waiving
some or all of their statutory employment rights.”).
121. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting opinion)
(noting that the enforcement gap will likely widen if employers can use mandatory
arbitration to prevent collective action).
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individual claim, employers could easily violate worker rights without
consequence. 122 Despite their education and status as professionals, 123
skilled immigrant workers in the tech sector are especially vulnerable
to the concerns raised by the dissent in Epic Systems.
B. Mandatory Arbitration and Skilled Immigrants in Tech
Tech jobs tend to be high paying 124 and attract highly-skilled
immigrants who have education and a global network. 125 Like other
educated professionals, immigrants in the technology sector enter into
various types of employment agreements. 126
Because large
companies are more likely to utilize mandatory arbitration, 127 it
follows that highly-skilled immigrants enter into employment
agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses with big Silicon
Valley companies. Like the majority’s unspoken assumptions about
equal bargaining power in Epic Systems, 128 there is a similar
perception that professional employees have near equal bargaining
power to negotiate contracts with employers. 129 Many courts have
echoed this sentiment, often holding professionals have equal
122. See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1309-10
(explaining that federal and state laws enacted to protect worker rights are
“worthless” if they are unenforceable, and employee rights are often enforced by
workers bringing individual and collective actions in courts, but mandatory
arbitration denies employees access to the courts).
123. See Hyacinth Leus, Practice Tips: Using the H-1B Visa to Fill Staffing
Needs with Foreign Professionals, 23 L.A. LAW. 24, 24 (2000) (stating in order to
qualify for an H-1B visa, the immigrant must qualify as a professional by having a
university degree or equivalent professional experience).
124. See Marissa Perino, The 20 Highest-paying Companies in Silicon Valley
in 2019, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/highestpaying-companies-silicon-valley-tech-2019-9 (explaining that many Silicon Valley
companies pay salaries that are above average).
125. See Farhad Manjoo, Why Silicon Valley Wouldn’t Work Without
TIMES
(Feb.
8,
2017),
Immigrants,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/technology/personaltech/why-silicon-valleywouldnt-work-without-immigrants.html.
126. See McClure, supra note 4, at 1497-98 (listing the different kinds of
professionals that enter into employment agreements, including engineers).
127. Colvin, supra note 3, at 11.
128. Greene & Neylon O’Brien, supra note 73, at 70.
129. McClure, supra note 4, at 1498.
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bargaining power with employers when professionals challenge
adhesion contracts in the employment context. 130 Courts reason
employment agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses and
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are not unconscionable, nor
entered into unknowingly, because professionals have the education,
skills, and experience necessary to negotiate their employment
agreements. 131
Professionals are perceived to have equal bargaining power
because of their education, business savvy, and possible experience
with the agreements they sign. 132 One article contends professionals
are “less likely . . . to be disadvantaged” by mandatory arbitration
provisions, and are less likely to agree to a contract “that is grossly
unfair to the employee.” 133 However, such presumptions about
professional bargaining power can be inaccurate. 134
This is
particularly true for skilled immigrants because they are subject to
employment visa sponsorship by a single employer. 135 Discussing the
reliance of skilled immigrants on their employers, Robert D. Aronson
and Debra A. Schneider note:
Foreign nationals holding nonimmigrant visa status based on
employment generally require the petitioning employer’s
involvement in order to maintain status. Not only is the beneficiary
dependent on the willingness of his or her employer to engage in
the sponsorship process, but the foreign national’s maintenance of
status is dependent on the continuation of employment in a manner
consistent with the terms of the nonimmigrant status.136

Essentially, the unique relationship between a sponsoring
employer and a skilled immigrant created by the H-1B visa process,
discourages skilled immigrants from quitting or going against their
130. Id. at 1509.
131. See Spitko, supra note 4, at 628; cf. McClure, supra note 4, at 1506-07
(detailing how courts find unequal bargaining power in cases where the employee is
a non-professional).
132. McClure, supra note 4, at 1515.
133. Spitko, supra note 4, at 628-32.
134. McClure, supra note 4, at 1516.
135. Lister, supra note 16, at 116.
136. Aronson & Schneider, supra note 25, at 951-52.
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employer. 137 Given the high level of dependency on the sponsoring
employer, a skilled immigrant who is offered employment through H1B visa sponsorship by a tech company in Silicon Valley is likely not
in a position to negotiate employment terms. This is because
changing employers on an H-1B visa costs money, can be timely and
risky, and could jeopardize a skilled immigrant employee’s
immigration status.138
Despite recent reforms to employment visa sponsorship which
aim to provide stability and security to immigrant workers, the
complexities and risk around switching employers or disrupting a
skilled worker’s immigration status still exists. 139 These issues are
compounded when a spouse or child is also relying on the skilled
immigrant’s H-1B visa status because losing a job or failure to find an
alternate employer could mean loss of immigration status for the
entire family. 140 Despite having a legal right to do so, many skilled
immigrants cannot realistically change employers. 141 Thus, the
benefits of immigration reform do little to increase bargaining power
for skilled immigrants. Assuming a skilled immigrant does not have
comparable options outside of the United States, 142 she will have
limited options under H-1B sponsorship; with limited options comes
less bargaining power. 143
Even though highly-skilled immigrants have a certain level of
knowledge and expertise, there can still be pressure to unwillingly
agree to mandatory arbitration.
With employment visas, the
137. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 4.
138. See Ahmed, supra note 75, at 945 (explaining although changes to
portability have made it “easier” to change employers, an H-1B visa holder still
needs the second employer to sponsor them, submit a new application and pay fees,
and the new application must be approved by the government).
139. See generally Aronson & Schneider, supra note 25 (discussing different
congressional actions and resulting regulations directed at skilled immigration and
noting that issues of uncertainty and disrupted immigration status still persist).
140. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor, supra note 6, at 926.
141. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 9.
142. Cf. Lister, supra note 16, at 111 (skilled immigrants on H-1B visas may
have just as good employment prospects overseas as in the United States). However,
the Lister article does not consider other reasons why a skilled immigrant with good
job prospects in their home country might still need a job in the United States.
143. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 268-69 (explaining how limited
employment options increase the imbalance of bargaining power).
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immigrant employee relies on the employer’s sponsorship.144
Because of this reliance on a single employer for sponsorship, skilled
immigrant employees are in a vulnerable position and can be taken
advantage of. 145 No matter how educated or business savvy a skilled
immigrant is, they may not resist a mandatory arbitration clause for
fear their employer will decline sponsorship. 146 Immigrant employees
sponsored to work in the United States are simply not in a position to
“protest unjust conditions or to quit.” 147 Highly skilled immigrants
are also unlikely to assert their rights against their employer, 148 which
brings up questions of whether consent to mandatory arbitration is
voluntary. 149 As a result, skilled immigrants who face discrimination
or are victims of wage and hour theft may suffer in silence if their
claim is too small to pursue individually. 150
Another potential issue is highly-skilled immigrants may not
understand the rights they are waiving when they agree to a
mandatory arbitration provision. 151 Skilled immigrants are likely
unfamiliar with arbitration, their legal options, and the U.S. legal
system. 152
Being in this position does not leave immigrant
144. Killawi, supra note 18, at 144 (explaining skilled immigrant workers are
usually sponsored by one employer through the H-1B temporary worker program,
and workers who are approved enter the United States and work for their petitioning
employer). See generally Hahm, supra note 23.
145. Hahm, supra note 23, at 1698.
146. See Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-1b Reform: A
Partial, Statutory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB.
L. 153, 172 (2007) (explaining that employers know that H-1B employees are less
likely to reject unreasonable assignments because their immigration status depends
on their employment).
147. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, supra note 40, at 4.
148. Goodsell, supra note 150, at 172.
149. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1636 n.2 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting opinion).
150. See id. at 1647 (arguing that expenses may outweigh bringing an
individual claim, and that fear of retaliation may also deter bringing an individual
claim).
151. See Nimmer, supra note 67, at 206 (discussing immigrants who do not
speak English, as “lack[ing] a strong knowledge of their statutory rights or the
American judicial system”). Nonetheless, the logic here, is the same, because
although a skilled immigrant likely speaks English, they may not have the basic
understanding of U.S. laws or the judicial system that a native-born worker would.
152. Id.
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professionals much better off than low-wage earning immigrants who
may not fully understand arbitration due to language barriers. 153 In
both cases, the immigrant employee does not appreciate the rights that
are relinquished with forced arbitration. 154 Furthermore, having little
to no experience with the U.S. legal system, immigrant employees are
likely worse off than native-born professionals who typically have
some knowledge of the U.S. legal system through general experience.
Thus, highly-skilled immigrants face unique challenges that nativeborn employees do not face when they are required to consent to a
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment agreement. 155
When the overwhelming trend has become to include mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment agreements, it becomes difficult for
workers, including skilled immigrant professionals in tech, to
negotiate against mandatory arbitration. 156 In the unlikely event that a
skilled immigrant professional in tech secures multiple employers for
U.S. sponsorship, the likelihood each of those employers requires
mandatory arbitration is high. 157 In other words, skilled immigrants in
tech faced with mandatory arbitration in one agreement are likely to
find similar provisions with different employers. For these reasons,
skilled immigrant workers in tech may be in a worse position to
negotiate employment terms than native-born professionals.

153. See Carlos Antonio Lopez, Revoking an Employer’s License to
Discriminate, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 532 (2004) (noting immigrant workers with
limited knowledge of English “may be unaware or uninformed of their employment
rights”).
154. See Sternlight, Stymies Progress, supra note 15, at 172 (“Studies have
shown that these kinds of clauses are not, in fact, generally read or understood by
employees.”).
155. See Sabrina Underwood, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social,
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the
H-1b Visa Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727 (2001) (discussing the various
inequities faced by H-1B visa workers.).
156. See McClure, supra note 4, at 1519.
157. See Colvin, supra note 3, at 23 (explaining that studies reveal that more
than half of U.S. workplaces subject their employees to mandatory arbitration
agreements).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol57/iss1/14

22

White: The Unlikely Underdog: Skilled Immigrants in Tech Face Unique Ma
White camera ready final (Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE UNLIKELY UNDERDOG

1/26/2021 11:04 AM

201

C. Public Opinion and Push Back
Although courts have increasingly moved towards enforcing
mandatory arbitration clauses in the employment context, 158 public
sentiment seems to be trending in the opposite direction. 159 Tech
workers have successfully used collective action to pressure some
Silicon Valley companies to abandon mandatory arbitration, at least
with respect to sexual harassment claims. 160 Because highly-skilled
immigrants make up a significant segment of the Silicon Valley tech
industry, 161 many of them were likely involved in worker pressure to
change how Silicon Valley Companies resolve employment disputes.
Tech workers’ stance against mandatory arbitration tends to mirror
general public opinion on the issue. 162 Studies also show that many
Americans oppose mandatory arbitration. 163

158. Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 79.
159. See generally Anna M. Hershenburg & Molly O’Casey, When the
Techies Go Marching In: An Industry Updates Its Sexual Harassment Dispute
Resolution Policy, 37 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 18 (2019).
160. See Molly O’Casey, A Movement is Born? Google Eliminates Mandatory
Arbitration, 37 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 60, 60-62 (2019); Daisuke
Wakabayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2018),
Sexual
Harassment,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexualharassment.html; Jillian D’Onfro, A Post-Walkout Google Goes Public with
Updated Harassment and Discrimination Policies, Promises to ‘Listen’, FORBES
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/04/25/a-postwalkout-google-goes-public-with-updated-harassment-and-discrimination-policiespromises-to-listen/#17ed09e076b1; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced
Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-sex-misconduct.html.
161. See Hahm, supra note 23, at 1682 (discussing that U.S. high-tech industry
largely participate in H-1B visa program to meet demand for skilled workers); see
also Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon Valley: Networks, Ethnic
Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 521 (2002) (stating
“high-technology businesses around the country are often heavy users of such H-1B
workers, nowhere more so than in Silicon Valley”).
162. National Study of Public Attitudes on Forced Arbitration, EMP. RTS.
ADVOC.
INST.
FOR
L.
&
POL’Y
(2009),
http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/publications/national-study-of-public-attitudeson-forced-arbitration/.
163. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

23

California Western Law Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 1, Art. 14
White camera ready final (Do Not Delete)

202

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/26/2021 11:04 AM

[Vol. 57

Recent scholarship credits social movements like “#metoo” and
“#timesup” with inspiring workers to speak out against mandatory
arbitration of sexual harassment claims. 164 In November 2018, tech
workers at Google offices worldwide walked out of work to protest
how Google handled sexual harassment claims. 165 One of the top
demands resulting from the protest was to abandon mandatory
arbitration of sexual harassment claims. 166 Google gave into these
demands and abandoned mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment
claims, 167 and after additional pressure from its employees, Google
ceased using mandatory arbitration for all employment disputes.168
Following in Google’s footsteps, other Silicon Valley tech companies
have eliminated mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment cases. 169
Some companies have also eliminated mandatory arbitration of
discrimination claims as well. 170
Although not a tactic used by tech professionals, drivers for
DoorDash, a Silicon Valley tech company, recently pushed back
against mandatory arbitration by simultaneously filing thousands of
individual arbitration claims. 171 The arbitration fees for DoorDash
164. See Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 140 (crediting the #metoo movement
with giving low-wage workers recognition and voice to speak out about workplace
injustices).
165. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Disrupting Adhesion Contracts with #metoo
Innovators, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 165, 188 (2019).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 189-90; Gerrit De Vynck, Google Moves to End Forced Arbitration
for All Worker Complaints, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019, 1:40 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-21/google-moves-to-end-forcedarbitration-for-all-worker-complaints.
168. De Vynck, supra note 171.
169. Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 94; Brendan Williams, Sign or Else:
Employment Arbitration in the Wake of an Epic Decision, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS &
SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 259, 268 (2019) (discussing Facebook arbitration agreement
changes); Hershenburg & O’Casey, supra note 163, at 23-24 (discussing arbitration
agreement changes at Apple, Airbnb, eBay, and Square).
170. Hershenburg & O’Casey, supra note 163, at 23; see also Jennifer S. Fan,
Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High Technology
Companies, 19 UTAH L. REV. 973, 1013-14 (2019) (explaining that Google, Airbnb,
and Microsoft are the few companies in Silicon Valley that have abandoned
mandatory arbitration for discrimination claims).
171. Charlotte Garden, Opinion, DoorDash’s Multimillion-dollar Arbitration
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WASH.
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alone were about $12 million. 172 When DoorDash refused to pay, the
drivers submitted a motion to compel DoorDash to arbitrate and
adhere to its own mandatory arbitration policy. 173 Faced with
thousands of simultaneous, individual arbitration claims, DoorDash
wanted to abandon mandatory arbitration and proceed with a class
action lawsuit for its own convenience. 174 However, Judge William
Alsup of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled in favor of the drivers and remarked, “DoorDash now
wishes to resort to a class-wide lawsuit, the very device it denied to
the workers, to avoid its duty to arbitrate. This hypocrisy will not be
blessed, at least by this order.” 175
Despite consistent judicial support for mandatory arbitration, 176
public sentiment is generally against the practice 177 and push back at
some Silicon Valley companies has been somewhat successful. 178
However, Congress has yet to deal with mandatory arbitration clauses
in employment agreements and has only introduced bills that would
eliminate mandatory arbitration for certain types of disputes but has
repeatedly failed to pass such legislation. 179

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/16/doordashs-multimilliondollar-arbitration-mistake/; Alison Frankel, ‘This Hypocrisy Will Not be Blessed’:
Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Feb. 11,
2020, 2:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-doordash/this-hypocrisywill-not-be-blessed-judge-orders-doordash-to-arbitrate-5000-couriers-claimsidUSKBN2052S1.
172. Frankel, supra note 175.
173. Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal.
2020).
174. See id. at 1065.
175. Id.
176. Giesbrecht-McKee, supra note 17, at 262.
177. Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural
Justice of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 77 (2010).
178. See O’Casey, supra note 164 (discussing the various technology
companies that have unilaterally chosen to abandon mandatory arbitration due to
pressure).
179. Andrew McWhorter, A Congressional Edifice: Reexamining the Statutory
Landscape of Mandatory Arbitration, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 521, 532-33
(2019).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

25

California Western Law Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 1, Art. 14
White camera ready final (Do Not Delete)

204

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

1/26/2021 11:04 AM

[Vol. 57

D. Federal Legislative Positions on Mandatory Arbitration
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s continued support for
mandatory arbitration in the employment context, scholar Alexander
J.S. Colvin places hope in Congress to reverse the trend and protect
U.S. workers. 180 Many Democratic lawmakers have spoken out about
the unfairness of mandatory arbitration, contending that mandatory
arbitration eliminates employee choice. 181 For example, a Democrat
majority led House of Representatives introduced the Forced
Arbitration Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act which aims to restrict
mandatory arbitration in certain contexts, including employment
agreements. 182
The FAIR Act sets forth two purposes regarding arbitration. 183
The Act’s first purpose seeks to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration
agreements regarding future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil
rights disputes. 184 The second purpose is broader than the first and
seeks to prohibit “agreements and practices that interfere with the
right of individuals, workers, or small businesses to participate in
joint, class, or collective actions related to an employment, consumer,
antitrust, or civil rights dispute.” 185
The FAIR Act still has an arduous journey before the bill becomes
law, 186 with opposing positions on mandatory arbitration generally
split along party lines. 187 Specifically, conservatives tend to support
180. Colvin, supra note 3, at 24 (“If the Supreme Court does not reverse its
trend of supporting mandatory arbitrations, it will be necessary for Congress to act
to ensure that American workers have an effective means of enforcing the rights
they have been promised.”).
181. See generally Andrew Wallender, Democrats Decry ‘Toxic Culture’ of
Forced Arbitration in Hearing, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (May 16, 2019, 1:06 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/democrats-decry-toxic-cultureof-forced-arbitration-in-hearing.
182. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. §
2(2) (2009).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals
for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 713 (2016) [hereinafter, Ware, Politics of
Arbitration].
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the enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions, while
progressives tend to oppose the use and enforcement of mandatory
arbitration provisions. 188
III. ARRIVING AT BALANCED SOLUTIONS
While there are plausible solutions to address the issues
surrounding mandatory arbitration, these solutions are not
comprehensive enough. For instance, it would seem that employee
action, like the Google walkout, effectively solves the problem of
employer-mandated arbitration, but such efforts do not yield
predictable results. Employees will not be successful every time they
make collective demands on their employer. 189 Additionally, leaving
employee rights to the discretion of employers will not produce
uniform protections for all employees.
A common proposed solution to the issue of mandatory arbitration
calls for Congress to pass legislation like the FAIR Act, which would
invalidate pre-dispute arbitration in the employment context. 190 This
approach would abrogate cases like Epic Systems. 191 The challenge
with this approach is its sweeping effect. 192 In some circumstances,
arbitration can be beneficial and preferred by both parties to a
dispute. 193 By taking a rigid stance against mandatory arbitration,
Congress would prevent employers from including arbitration
provisions in employment agreements, even when the employee
understands, wants, and agrees with that provision.
Another approach to resolve problems imposed by mandatory
arbitration is to balance the bargaining power between an employee
and employer, preventing issues of fairness and increasing informed
188. Id. at 719.
189. Fan, supra note 174, at 998.
190. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1354; Colvin, supra
note 3, at 24; Ditkowsky, supra note 82, at 94-95 (advocating for legislation that
would make arbitration of employment disputes completely unenforceable).
191. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 78, at 1354.
192. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV.
457, 493 (2011) (describing a prior version of the FAIR Act as “excessively broad”).
193. For a brief discussion on the benefits of arbitration see James, supra note
85, at 536-41.
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consent. 194 Collective action by employees on the front end could be
useful. To do this, employees may consider unionizing, which would
allow for negotiating employment terms, including whether parties
use arbitration to resolve disputes. 195 The difficulties with this
approach are the decline of unionized labor in the United States 196 and
employers are able to vigorously reject unions in their workplaces.197
These challenges are more profound in a place like Silicon Valley
because unions are generally not prevalent in the tech industry. 198 As
one commentator noted, “Unionization is unlikely in industries
marked by ‘short job tenures, heavy use of temporary labor, and heavy
use of immigrant labor’—practices associated with Silicon Valley.” 199
Rather than a divisive approach to mandatory arbitration, an ideal
solution is a balanced approach that considers employee rights, the
interests of justice, and the benefits of arbitration. By proposing
complete elimination of mandatory arbitration in employment
agreements, Congress assumes an employee would never consent to a
pre-dispute arbitration provision. 200 Instead, Congress could enact
legislation that utilizes a balancing test or factor test for courts to
follow when a mandatory arbitration clause is challenged by an
employee. This approach may be more likely to receive bi-partisan
support.
There are several balancing factors a court should consider in
determining whether it should enforce an arbitration provision. One
factor a court may consider is the number of similar claims other
employees seek to bring against the employer. If it is clear justice is
194. Green, supra note 12, at 82.
195. Id. at 79, 89. (explaining how union representation allows for collective
action that balances power in employment negotiations).
196. Barbara J. Fick, The Changing Face of the American Workplace, 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 1, 5 (1998).
197. Green, supra note 12, at 100.
198. Kenneth M. Geisler II, Fissures in the Valley: Searching for a Remedy
for U.S. Tech Workers Indirectly Displaced by H-1B Visa Outsourcing Firms, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 465, 500 (2017) (discussing how unions are fairly absent in the
tech industry).
199. Id. (quoting Hyde, supra note 165, at 498).
200. See Sharon Hoffman, supra note 81, at 156 (discussing how the
advantages of arbitration may be “appealing to both the employer and the employee”
and that arbitration is a “commendable option for work-related disputes as long as
they are not coercive”).
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better served through a collective action, employees might not be
forced to arbitrate. Another factor courts may look at is the
employee’s position in society. If the employee’s social status is one
that is vulnerable to exploitation or abuse, arbitration would not be
required. A third factor may be the legal and societal impact of an
employee’s claim. If the claim is one that would contribute to case law
regarding a statutory right or constitutional right, arbitration might not
be compelled. Lastly, courts may balance these three factors against
the employer’s interest for seeking arbitration. If the employer’s
interest in arbitrating the dispute outweighs the employee’s interest
against arbitration, then the employee might be required to arbitrate.
A second solution could be found in the use of exceptions.
Exceptions are a common legal mechanism and are equally as
important as the laws they modify. 201 Congress seeks to eliminate
mandatory arbitration and practices that would limit collective action
through the FAIR Act. 202 Exceptions to a general ban on mandatory
arbitration can achieve the objectives of the FAIR Act in a more
equitable manner. For example, Congress could enact legislation that
does not outright ban mandatory arbitration, but generally prohibits
mandatory arbitration, subject to narrow exceptions. This approach
would likely be more successful than the FAIR Act, as drafted,
considering the political makeup of the current Congress. 203 Using
exceptions could allow litigation or collective actions—despite
mandatory arbitration provisions—in certain circumstances. For
example, the use of an exception in the case of DoorDash would have
allowed drivers to bring a class action when the number of arbitrations
201. See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872 (1991)
(“But although exceptions are an omnipresent feature of the legal terrain, their very
pervasiveness appears to prompt the view that exceptions are but adjuncts to what is
really important. However useful it may be to consider specific exceptions in
particular doctrinal realms, thinking about exceptions as such does not get us very
far in thinking about law.”).
202. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 2(2)
(2009).
203. With the Democrats controlling the House of Representatives and
Republicans controlling the Senate, legislation that completely eliminates mandatory
arbitration is not likely to receive bi-partisan support. See Ware, Politics of
Arbitration, supra note 191, at 719 (explaining that conservatives generally support
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions, while progressives generally
oppose enforcement).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

29

California Western Law Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 1, Art. 14
White camera ready final (Do Not Delete)

208

1/26/2021 11:04 AM

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

contemplated exceeded a threshold number, which would have been
beneficial to both DoorDash and its drivers.
Turning specifically to skilled immigrants, Congress has enacted
legislation to protect immigrants workers in the past. 204 Because
skilled immigrants with H-1B visa status are distinguishable from
other employees, 205 Congress can pass legislation to create an
exception that requires employers to specifically provide sponsored
immigrants with options for arbitration and traditional litigation.206
Although this is not to advocate for preferential treatment of skilled
immigrants over native-born workers, 207 the rights of skilled
immigrants in tech will be better protected if they have additional
options to resolve their disputes. 208 However, given the fact skilled
immigrants face unique challenges with mandatory arbitration because
of their H-1B visa status, enacting legislation with exceptions
specifically tailored for the unique experience of skilled immigrants
could be a useful solution.
CONCLUSION
As this Comment highlights, skilled immigrants in Silicon Valley
are not likely to be viewed as a group particularly vulnerable to the
disadvantages imposed by mandatory arbitration. Skilled immigrants’
204. Rick Su, Working on Immigration: Three Models of Labor and
Employment Regulation, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 331, 341 (2012) (stating that federal
immigration laws also regulate “employment relations involving immigrant
workers”).
205. Rajiv S. Khanna, Liquidated Damages Clauses in H-1b Visa Holders’
Employment Contracts, 58 PRAC. LAW. 37, 37 (Oct. 2012).
206. Congress has used its legislative power to address other issues unique to
sponsored immigrants. Id. (discussing federal laws specifically tailored to protect H1B employees from being “subjected to penalties for leaving [a] sponsoring
employer”).
207. See Su, supra note 211, at 345 (recommending that regulations should
avoid setting immigrants and native workers apart but noting immigrant workers
need to be empowered “so that they can negotiate the labor market in the same way
as native workers”).
208. See Pamela G. Rubin, Immigrants as Grievants: Protecting the Rights of
Non-English-Speaking Union Members in Labor Arbitration, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
557, 571 (1994) (contending that with labor disputes, courts and legislatures can
“uphold immigrants’ rights by affording them more options to pursue their
grievances”).
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education, high-paying jobs, and status as professionals create a
perception that they have equal bargaining power with powerful
Silicon Valley employers. Yet, employment visa sponsorship creates
unique challenges for skilled immigrants regarding the stability of
their immigration status and their ability to change jobs. Because a
limited number of H-1B visas are in high demand, skilled immigrants
risk their livelihoods and possible deportation if they are fired or
unable to find another sponsoring employer. H-1B visa regulations
create a strong reliance on the sponsoring employer by the immigrant
employee, drastically weakening the skilled immigrant’s bargaining
power and their ability to negotiate arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. Although some Silicon Valley companies have done away
with mandatory arbitration in certain cases, employers’ wide use of
mandatory arbitration, and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of it,
compounds the challenges faced by skilled immigrants.
Moreover, extreme approaches on either side of the mandatory
arbitration debate either disregard the notice and consent problems
that mandatory arbitration poses, or disregard the benefits that
consensual, pre-dispute arbitration agreements provide. The practice
of imposing arbitration in the employment agreements cannot be
characterized as just or fair. Instead of endorsing or eliminating
arbitration in the employment context, solutions should strive for a
middle ground that allows employees to bypass mandatory arbitration
when certain interests are served. A less polarized approach to
mandatory arbitration not only benefits skilled immigrant workers, but
it is also advantageous for all U.S. workers.
Alexa S. White ∗

∗

J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, 2021; B.A., cum laude,
University of Massachusetts – Boston, 2008. I am sincerely grateful to Mollie Levy,
Ariel Valerio-Meek, Hannah Hughes, and the entire editing team of California
Western Law Review for their feedback and efforts throughout the publication
process. I thank Professor India Thusi for her reassurance and guidance. I would
also like to thank my colleagues at Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP for
their encouragement and unwavering support. Finally, I thank my friends and
family for everything, but I especially thank my son, Nasir Himmelberger, for his
understanding, sacrifice, patience, and love as I achieved law school goals beyond
my wildest dreams.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

31

